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So Near and Yet So Far: The 1995 
Quebec Referendum in Perspective
Nicholas Bayne
Abstract
Pierre Trudeau and Brian Mulroney failed to reconcile Quebec with the 
rest of Canada. The Parti Québécois (PQ) government under Jacques 
Parizeau called a referendum in October 1995 to decide if the province 
would secede. While the federal government under Jean Chrétien barely 
intervened, the fiery rhetoric of Lucien Bouchard brought the separatists 
close to victory. Quebecers voted to stay in Canada by only 1 per cent. 
A massive late rally of non-Quebec Canadians pleading with Quebecers 
to remain probably tipped the balance. Bouchard, who succeeded 
Parizeau, never felt confident of winning another referendum. Later the 
PQ lost ground as separatism ceased to appeal. In the EU referendum of 
2016 the British government failed to learn from Canada’s experience. 
The Remain side campaigned negatively rather than positively, and did 
not mobilize its supporters as well as the Leave camp did. Canadian 
comparisons also remain relevant for Scotland.
Introduction
On Monday 30 October 1995, the people of Quebec voted in a 
referendum on whether to remain part of Canada. The turnout was 
extremely high, at 93 per cent. 49.4 per cent voted Yes, i.e. to separate; 
50.6 per cent voted No. Quebecers decided to stay in Canada by a margin 
of barely one per cent. Yet over 20 years later, Canada is still united.
In this article I will examine how this referendum happened, as 
the third in a series; how it produced this result; and why it has not 
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been repeated.1 In my conclusion I shall explore parallels with referenda 
taking place in the United Kingdom: on independence for Scotland and 
on membership of the European Union. I have drawn on my experience 
as British High Commissioner to Canada from 1992 to 1996.2 I have 
also had great help from two former colleagues: Ivor Rawlinson, then 
Consul-General in Montreal; and Patrick Holdich, then head of the 
Political Section at the High Commission in Ottawa, who later held the 
Montreal post also.
The first referendum of 1980: Trudeau and Lévesque
From its creation in 1867, the Dominion of Canada was a federation.3 
It began with four founding provinces, which have now risen to ten 
together with three Arctic territories. In federations there is often a 
power struggle between the central government and the component 
provinces and usually rivalry among provinces as well. In Canada, 
Quebec asserted itself in both respects. This was because of its long-
standing French legacy of history, language, law and culture, which 
defined its identity.4
Yet by the twentieth century Quebec had also become an economic 
powerhouse, centred on the cosmopolitan city of Montreal. Many large 
Canadian firms were based there and the city hosted the World’s Fair in 
1967 and the Olympic Games in 1976. This prosperity attracted English 
speakers to the province in increasing numbers, which challenged 
its francophone traditions. A movement emerged which argued that 
Quebec could only preserve its identity if it separated itself from the rest 
of Canada. This movement profited from the vacuum left by the decline 
of the Roman Catholic Church, the historic foundation of Quebec.
Separatism was manifested in various ways. French President 
Charles de Gaulle, when he visited Montreal in 1967, famously cried out 
‘Vive le Québec libre!’5 In 1970 a terrorist group, the Front de Libération de 
Québec (FLQ), kidnapped James Cross, the British Trade Commissioner, 
and Pierre Laporte, a Quebec minister. Cross was released, but Laporte 
was murdered. Pierre Trudeau, recently elected as Canadian Prime 
Minister, invoked federal emergency laws and applied them with 
extreme rigour.6 Yet the most lasting sign was the formation of the Parti 
Québécois (PQ) in 1968, led by René Lévesque, with Jacques Parizeau 
as a founder member. The goal of the PQ was Quebec sovereignty. This 
meant separating Quebec from the rest of Canada, though without 
necessarily going as far as complete independence.7
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In 1976 the PQ won the provincial election, defeating the Quebec 
Liberal Party under Robert Bourassa. Thereafter, PQ and Liberals 
alternated in power at intervals of exactly nine years, up until 2012. 
Lévesque, as premier, invited Quebecers to vote for ‘sovereignty- 
association’ in a referendum in May 1980, the first of the three. 
Despite – or perhaps because of – the ambiguity of the new status 
proposed for Quebec, it was rejected by 60 per cent against 40 per cent, 
on an 86 per cent turnout. Even so, Quebec suffered economic damage, 
as big firms moved away and outside investment dried up.8 Lévesque 
never contemplated another referendum and the PQ lost power in 1985. 
The matter might have rested there, except for Trudeau’s intervention.
Trudeau, himself a Quebecer, was a conviction politician, 
combative and single-minded.9 Returned to power early in 1980, he 
resolved to unify Canada by amending the constitution. He put his 
justice minister, another Quebecer called Jean Chrétien, in charge of 
the process. In a speech just before the referendum Trudeau promised 
Quebecers that if they rejected sovereignty, they would benefit from his 
constitutional reforms.10 These reforms introduced a new Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, which provided that all Canadians should have 
access to education in both English and French. But education was a 
provincial responsibility and Quebec law required public education 
to be conducted in French. Quebecers felt betrayed by Trudeau. After 
other provinces were reluctantly brought to accept Trudeau’s reforms, 
Lévesque still held out against them. He mounted a legal challenge to 
the Constitution Act of 1982, without success. The Act became law, but 
Quebec refused to ratify it.11 Trudeau had sought to unify Canada, but 
ended by increasing tension between Quebec and the rest.
The second referendum of 1992: Mulroney and Bourassa
After Trudeau retired from politics, the federal election of 1984 was won 
by the Conservatives, led by Brian Mulroney, another Quebecer though 
of Irish ancestry. He campaigned on a promise to reconcile Quebec to 
the rest of Canada, which gained him many seats in the province. In 
provincial elections the Quebec Liberals defeated the PQ and Robert 
Bourassa returned to office.
I never saw Trudeau in action, but I observed Mulroney at close 
quarters. He was a dealmaker and conciliator, who used his Irish 
charm to win people round.12 He encouraged Bourassa to devise 
 constitutional formulae that would respond to Quebec’s needs. These 
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were put to the provincial premiers as part of a new settlement, the 
Meech Lake Accord of 1987. The key provisions were: Quebec was 
recognized as ‘a distinct society’; more powers were transferred to the 
provinces; and future constitutional amendments would require the 
assent of all provinces.
Meech Lake was welcomed in Quebec. It was accepted by the 
federal Liberals, though not by Trudeau and Chrétien, and it found 
favour with public opinion. Since it changed the amending formula 
of the constitution, it had to be ratified by all provincial legislatures 
within three years. With time, however, opinion in the rest of Canada 
turned against the accord, which was thought to give unfair privileges 
to Quebec. As the deadline approached, two provinces failed to adopt it. 
Time ran out and the Meech Lake Accord lapsed in 1990.13
Quebec saw this as a cruel rejection by the rest of Canada and 
separatist sentiments were revived. Bourassa felt obliged to promise a 
referendum on Quebec’s future in Canada by October 1992, unless a 
better constitutional offer was available. This encouraged Mulroney to try 
again, but conditions were now less favourable. Other provinces had their 
own demands, while the aboriginal peoples sought recognition. Canadians 
in general were tired of constitutional rounds and wanted more attention 
to economic issues. Mounting public debt had obliged Mulroney to cut 
back public spending and raise taxes, which was not well received.
Mulroney’s second attempt reached its climax in the summer of 
1992. A conference of federal and provincial ministers was hard at 
work when the Queen came to Ottawa for Canada Day on 1 July, to 
mark the 125th anniversary of Confederation. I had just arrived as High 
Commissioner and I heard her publicly urge the parties to agree. Sure 
enough, a deal was struck, so that a meeting between Prime Minister 
Mulroney, Quebec Premier Bourassa and all the other provincial 
premiers was fixed for late August in Prince Edward Island. There they 
formally endorsed the Charlottetown Accord.
This was a clumsier package than Meech Lake. As before, 
Quebec would be recognized as a distinct society; more powers were 
shifted away from the centre; and constitutional amendments required 
agreement by all provinces. In addition, the federal Senate would 
have a new method of selection; the aboriginal peoples would move 
towards self-government; and sundry new rights and freedoms were 
introduced. This complex deal was accepted by the federal and all 
provincial governments: by the Liberal opposition, including Chrétien 
(now its leader) though not Trudeau; by the main aboriginal leaders; 
and by most of the media. I commended it to London. Mulroney 
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declared a nationwide referendum in October 1992, to meet Bourassa’s 
deadline.
Canadian elites backed the Charlottetown Accord. But the 
Canadian people rejected it in this second referendum, by 54 per 
cent against 46 per cent with an average turnout of 72 per cent. The 
strongest rejection was in Western Canada, but it was also voted 
down in Quebec. This result reflected deep public frustration across 
the country. Canada was in a recession, which increased the pain of 
measures to correct the budget deficit. Canadians felt poor and put 
upon. They held Mulroney’s government responsible and punished it 
by the means at hand.14
Charlottetown failed, just like Meech Lake. As before, this outcome 
boosted separatist feeling in Quebec. Mulroney, like Trudeau, had 
sought to unify Canada, but ended by increasing tension between 
Quebec and the rest.
The third referendum, October 1995: Chrétien, Parizeau 
and Bouchard
In 1993 Mulroney stepped down. The Conservatives went into federal 
elections, with uncertain prospects. The Canadian people punished 
them again and they were annihilated. They won only two seats, one 
being held in Quebec by Jean Charest. The Liberals came back into 
power, under Jean Chrétien as prime minister.
But the Liberals did not do well in Quebec. Most seats went 
instead to a new party, the Bloc Québécois (BQ), a federal manifesta-
tion of the provincial Parti Québécois (PQ). The BQ was founded and 
led by Lucien Bouchard, whom Mulroney had brought into politics as 
part of his campaign to reconcile Quebec.15 He had won a Conservative 
seat in Quebec and joined Mulroney’s second cabinet. But after Meech 
Lake was rejected he broke with Mulroney and joined the separatist 
camp. His BQ profited from Quebecers’ disgust at the failure of all 
Mulroney’s policies and their mistrust of the Liberals and of Chrétien in 
person. They won so many seats as to be the second party in the federal 
parliament and form the official opposition. Many feared dire conse-
quences, but in fact the BQ made little impact either in Ottawa or back 
in Quebec.16 Bouchard himself, however, gained much sympathy when 
he survived a near-fatal disease, at the cost of losing a leg.
The Parti Québécois returned to power in September 1994. Jacques 
Parizeau, the new premier, declared he would hold a referendum on 
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Quebec sovereignty within a year. Parizeau had an avuncular manner 
that concealed both a lively brain – he had a doctorate from the 
LSE – and a fierce political determination.17 When I first met him as 
premier, I told him my government wanted Canada to stay united. ‘I 
am not surprised’, he said with a smile.18 Parizeau intended Quebec 
to move directly to independence. He claimed it could still use the 
Canadian dollar, enjoy dual citizenship and be grandfathered in the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). He was convinced that 
Quebec would prosper in those conditions and commissioned economic 
studies to prove it, though he suppressed those that disagreed with him. 
In his view, there was no turning back if a majority voted for sovereignty. 
I was at a lunch in Ottawa with the European Union ambassadors where 
Parizeau insisted that Quebecers would then be ‘in a lobster pot’, from 
which they could not escape.19
However, not all of the PQ members were as militant as Parizeau. 
There was also a more moderate wing, led by Bouchard, who wanted 
the referendum to trigger negotiations with the federal government. 
After much debate, the party agreed to hold its referendum on Monday 
30 October 1995, with a long question that combined both views:
Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign, after having 
made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political 
partnership, within the scope of the Bill respecting the future of 
Quebec and of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995?20
The final phrase referred to a pledge that post-referendum negotiations 
must be complete within a year; Parizeau had insisted on this.
As the referendum approached, Daniel Johnson, who now led the 
Quebec Liberals, kept his head down, believing that the PQ would run 
themselves into the ground. On the federal government side, Chrétien 
wanted to avoid the mistakes made by Trudeau and Mulroney. He was 
a cautious but determined politician, who followed his instincts. He 
chose to adopt a low profile, convinced that the good sense of his fellow 
Quebecers would produce the right answer. In his memoirs Chrétien 
states that he ‘reluctantly went along’ with his advisers, who wanted 
him to limit his participation.21 But that was not how it looked at the 
time. Chrétien knew he was unpopular in Quebec because of his links 
with Trudeau and largely kept out of the province himself. He often 
clashed with Johnson, while insisting federal referendum strategy was 
only handled by Quebecers in his own entourage. Chrétien denied 
any role to people from elsewhere in Canada. He vetoed contingency 
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planning against a Yes vote, since this would suggest the federalists 
expected to lose.22
For a long time this looked like the right strategy. Parizeau was 
not a good public advocate for his cause. He reassured committed 
separatists, but did not win over the undecided. Opinion polls showed 
support for Yes (i.e. separation) at barely 45 per cent in early October, 
a month before the vote. Then Parizeau handed over the campaign to 
Lucien Bouchard, which changed everything.
Bouchard had many assets.23 As a moderate separatist, he believed 
many Quebecers were not ready for a single leap into independence; 
they would prefer a transitional process before they took this irrevocable 
step. This attitude brought into the separatist camp supporters of the 
small Action Démocratique du Québec, led by Mario Dumont.24 Bouchard 
was personally popular in Quebec for breaking with Mulroney after 
Meech Lake. By surviving his deadly disease he had become a sort of 
secular saint. His widely reported remark to the surgeons during his 
amputation – ‘Que l’on continue’ (Keep going) – was taken as an appeal 
to the separatist camp.25 Finally, he was a magnetic orator and attracted 
vast crowds to his public rallies. He captured people’s attention and won 
them to his side.
Opinion polls now moved rapidly in the separatists’ favour. With 
ten days to go they were showing the Yes side ahead, by 54 per cent to 
46 per cent, having gained seven points in a week. When Paul Martin, 
the finance minister, spelt out publicly the economic drawbacks of 
separation, this was dismissed as scaremongering. The federal strategy 
was close to collapse and there was panic in Ottawa. Johnson appealed 
to Chrétien to reaffirm the pledges of constitutional change to benefit 
Quebec. Chrétien refused, but the press saw this as evidence of fatal 
disunity in the No camp.26
Chrétien decided he must take over the campaign. He gave in to 
Johnson and, speaking in Montreal, promised ‘a new deal’ that would 
confirm Quebec as a distinct society and increase provincial powers. He 
also made two sombre appeals on television, in French and English.27 
Meanwhile, concern mounted all across the country. Chrétien’s ministers 
from outside Quebec, led by Brian Tobin, the fisheries minister from 
Newfoundland, could no longer endure the prospect of Canada coming 
apart. They overrode his order to keep silent and mounted a vast 
demonstration in Montreal, three days before the vote. This attracted a 
crowd over 100,000 strong and was attended by Chrétien, Johnson and 
four provincial premiers. The rally put over the message that the rest of 
Canada wanted Quebec to stay.28
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There were also some foreign interventions in the campaign. US 
President Bill Clinton, after meeting Chrétien in New York, declared at 
a press conference:
I can tell you that a strong and united Canada has been a 
wonderful partner for the United States … I hope we’ll be able to 
continue that.29
He repeated the formula several times, without referring to a script. 
French President Jacques Chirac was more ambiguous when interviewed 
by Larry King for CNN. He said that France would not interfere; but if 
Quebec voted to separate ‘of course we would recognise the fact’.30 
British Prime Minister John Major made no public statement (I had 
advised against one) but sent Chrétien a personal message of support 
just ahead of the vote. When I transmitted this, Chrétien told me the No 
camp was regaining lost ground and the Montreal rally had been a shot 
in the arm.31 But if Yes should win, he hoped the UK would still back the 
federal government.
On referendum day, Parizeau and Bouchard, convinced they would 
win, were drafting their victory speeches. By chance John Coles, the 
head of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, was visiting Ottawa 
that day; after the polls closed we sat before the television in Earnscliffe 
to watch the results come in, district by district.32 For some reason, 
the rural francophone districts reported first. Suspense grew as the Yes 
votes built up a dangerous lead. The Montreal results only began to 
come in after 10pm. The No votes inched up the dial to just past the 
total for Yes. The disappointment proved too hard for Parizeau to bear 
and he publicly blamed his defeat on ‘money and the ethnic vote’.33 He 
resigned at once as premier after this racist comment, as he had always 
intended to do if the vote went against him.
Causes and consequences
The next section of this article addresses three questions in turn:
• What would have happened if the Yes side had won?
• What caused the unusual result, with so large a turnout and so 
narrow a margin?
• Why has Quebec remained in Canada, after coming so close to 
leaving?
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Consequences of a Yes vote
There has been much speculation about this.34 I can record here 
what I thought would happen at the time. Chrétien had forbidden 
any contingency plans and later wrote: ‘I did not debate – and will 
never debate – what I would have done if the Yes side had won.’35 
Nevertheless, he had left some clues. It looked as if he would keep 
Parizeau guessing as long as possible. He would contest the result and 
launch a legal challenge to it, especially if the margin was small. He 
would drag his feet over any negotiations. If Parizeau declared Quebec 
independent unilaterally, Chrétien would deny his right to break up 
Canada.36
On his side, Parizeau had anticipated that Chrétien would play 
for time and had lined up measures designed to force his hand.37 
The Quebec provincial assembly would meet at once to endorse the 
referendum result. A supportive letter from local dignitaries would be 
published. Canadian soldiers stationed in Quebec would be invited to 
join the new Quebec army. Even before the vote all embassies in Ottawa 
were being lobbied to extend diplomatic recognition. Parizeau believed 
his trump card was a pledge by President Jacques Chirac that France 
would at once recognize Quebec as an independent state and encourage 
other francophone countries to do so.
When Parizeau visited France in January 1995, he had called on 
Chirac, then only Mayor of Paris. Chirac had said publicly that if Quebec 
voted to leave, France ‘would stand by the Quebecois and support and 
recognise the new situation’.38 Had he gone further in private, either 
then or later? My French contacts in Ottawa were nervous and so was 
Chrétien, as his memoirs reveal. Chirac was known to be impulsive, and 
relations between the two men were not good. Chrétien had publicly 
belittled Chirac’s chances of being elected president in May; Chirac had 
tried to hijack the agenda of the Halifax G7 summit in June, so that 
Chrétien had to exert his authority from the chair.39 Even so, since he 
became president, Chirac had been correct in public over Quebec, if not 
exactly helpful. If he had made any private pledges, these were never 
tested.
reasons for the result
A month before the referendum it looked as if the Yes side were bound to 
lose, with polls giving them less than 45 per cent of the vote. Bouchard’s 
rhetoric brought them to within a whisker of 50 per cent on the day, 
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while all the polls had forecast they would win. The turnout of 93 per 
cent was exceptional, even by Quebec standards. What can explain this 
result?
In my view the Yes side was indeed heading for victory, until 
events in the last few days brought out a late surge in No voters 
that the polls did not catch. Two events could have encouraged this: 
Chrétien’s pledge of constitutional reforms; and the pro-Canada rally 
in Montreal. At the time I believed that Chrétien’s move was decisive; 
I am now more sceptical. It was clearly an act of desperation, against 
his settled principles. After the event he carried out his promise without 
enthusiasm. Having sounded out Mike Harris, the new premier of 
Ontario, he concluded there would be no support for another consti-
tutional round. He simply introduced a resolution in parliament to 
recognize Quebec as a distinct society and to give Quebec, Ontario, 
Atlantic Canada, the Prairie provinces and British Columbia each a veto 
on constitutional change.40
At the time Daniel Johnson thought the Montreal rally made things 
worse; but Chrétien gave his consent for it to happen and welcomed it 
later.41 If it had really irritated Quebecers, the Yes vote would have been 
even larger than the polls forecast. I believe the demonstration provided 
something that had been missing till then. The campaigners on both 
sides had hitherto focused exclusively on what Quebecers would gain, 
or what they would lose, by leaving Canada. Until the Montreal rally, no 
one had shown Quebecers what they gained by remaining in Canada, 
as part of this wider community. The rally served to dramatize the 
choice facing Quebec. Its positive and emotional message might not 
have changed people’s minds. But it encouraged those still undecided, 
who would have stayed at home, to turn out and vote No. These were 
just enough to tip the scale and produce the exceptional level of votes 
cast. Justin Trudeau, then a student at McGill University, now Canadian 
Prime Minister, was at the rally and reached similar conclusions. He 
felt it was a seminal event, whose impact outlasted the campaign, and 
provided ‘an opportunity for Canadians to express their attachment to 
Quebec’.42
Yet if the rest of Canada could produce so strong an impact, 
why did Chrétien exclude them from his campaign? I believe previous 
experience had made him mistrustful. Other provincial governments, 
after initial resistance, had left Quebec isolated in opposing Trudeau’s 
constitutional reforms. Other provincial legislatures had frustrated 
Meech Lake, while the electorates of Western Canada had voted 
massively against Charlottetown. On each occasion Quebec had felt 
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rejected by the rest of Canada and support for separation had surged. 
This time Chrétien had wanted the Quebecers to make up their own 
minds, without any outside influences. In fact this played into the 
separatists’ hands, with almost fatal results.
Why is Quebec still in Canada?
After the nail-biting referendum result, many observers thought Quebec 
was bound to leave Canada eventually. I believed at the time that the 
odds had now turned against Canada remaining united. Francophone 
Quebecers made up 80 per cent of the population and nearly 60 per 
cent of them had voted to separate. There had been a steady outflow 
of English speakers and other non-francophones since 1980 and this 
gathered speed right after the referendum. It looked as if demographic 
trends would deliver the province to the separatists in a few years’ 
time. Yet even before I left Canada in February 1996 I was changing 
my mind.
One reason was voter fatigue. Lucien Bouchard quickly replaced 
Parizeau as Quebec premier. He was widely expected to call new 
elections, followed very soon by another referendum. But Bouchard 
did not want another referendum unless he knew he could win it. 
Quebecers had endured non-stop politics for four years – a referendum, 
federal elections, provincial elections and another referendum. He could 
not rely on them turning out again; they needed a rest.
Bouchard also wanted to delay until Quebec was strong enough 
to thrive on its own. Public finances in Canada, both federal and 
provincial, were heavily indebted. Paul Martin had imposed deep public 
spending cuts to balance the Canadian budget and reduce the burden 
of federal debt. Quebec had the largest provincial debt in relation to its 
size. Bouchard made the restoration of healthy finances and buoyant 
economic growth his first priority.
In the event, Bouchard never felt strong enough to launch another 
referendum, though he was re-elected in 1998. Nor did his successor 
Bernard Landry, a close ally of Parizeau. This was because Jean Charest, 
elected in 1993 as the sole federal Conservative in the province (and 
present at the Montreal rally), had become leader of the Quebec Liberals 
and revived their fortunes. In 2003, after the usual nine years in power, 
the PQ lost power to the Liberals and Charest took over as premier. 
This suggested that the Quebec population was no longer hooked on 
separation. Lucien Bouchard, who had sought to divide Canada, in fact 
ended by keeping Quebec within it.
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In Ottawa Chrétien was sharply criticized for nearly allowing 
the break-up of Canada and was determined to make it harder for this 
to happen in future. He asked the Supreme Court to rule on whether 
Quebec had the right to secede from Canada unilaterally. The Court’s 
judgement, delivered in 1998, was nicely balanced. Quebec had no 
right to secede unilaterally; but the Canadian government was bound 
to negotiate if Quebecers expressed a clear will to secede. The Canadian 
parliament could also decide if a referendum question was clear enough 
to trigger negotiations. Both federal and Quebec governments declared 
they were pleased with the judgement.43
Chrétien used the judgement as the basis of the Clarity Act of 
2000, but went further. The Act empowered the Canadian parliament to 
determine, in advance of the vote, if a referendum question in Quebec 
or any other province was precise enough. After the vote, parliament 
could decide if a clear will had been expressed and would override a 
referendum result that was contrary to the act.44 This law was not well 
received, being attacked by other provinces as well as Quebec. It was 
also opposed by the federal Conservatives, whose policy, when they 
later regained power under Stephen Harper, was not to stir up the 
Quebec issue. Chrétien declared he ‘was immensely pleased’ when the 
Clarity Act was adopted.45 Yet I doubt whether it would be an effective 
defence against a strongly backed separatist movement. It imposes 
constraints before a referendum vote, especially on how the question is 
drafted. But the powers given to the federal parliament to reverse the 
vote once taken could prove impossible to enforce. The best protection 
lies in changing opinion in the Quebec population, where recent events 
have been encouraging.
Jean Charest’s time as Quebec Premier lasted the usual nine years. 
During this time the Bloc Québécois lost ground badly, dropping to only 
four seats in the 2011 federal elections.46 Despite this, the PQ regained 
power in 2012, though only with a plurality of seats. The new premier, 
Pauline Marois, made no promises of a future referendum, preferring 
to wait till she could win a clear majority. After a strong start she felt 
confident enough to call early elections in April 2014. But her plans 
went badly astray. During the campaign it emerged that a PQ majority 
would be taken as the signal for a new referendum. This was not what 
the Quebec electorate wanted to hear. They voted the Liberals back into 
power with 70 seats and a large majority. The PQ won only 30 seats, 
with their smallest share of the vote since 1970, their first appearance. 
Quebec politics has clearly moved a long way from what I experienced 
more than 20 years ago.
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Conclusions: What Britain should have learnt from 
Canada about referenda
The United Kingdom, like Canada in the twentieth century, might 
have to undergo the ordeal of three referenda early in the twenty-first 
century: one on whether Scotland stayed in the UK in 2014; one on 
whether the UK stayed in the European Union in 2016; and a second 
one on Scotland, which is already threatened. Scotland decided in 2014 
to remain part of the UK by a margin of 55 per cent against 45 per cent. 
But the 2016 referendum meant that the UK would have to leave the EU 
after over 40 years as a member. This was the decision of 52 per cent of 
voters against 48 per cent, on a 78 per cent turnout. The government 
was wholly unprepared for this result.
If the Remain campaign had studied the lessons that emerged 
from the Canadian experience and put them into practice, the UK might 
still be in the EU and the chances of Scotland leaving the Union much 
reduced. To my mind, there are three key lessons, to be analysed in turn:
• Remember referendum votes are volatile.
• Campaign positively, not just negatively.
• Motivate your backers to turn out on the day.
Lesson 1 Remember votes in referenda are volatile
In referenda, electors do not always vote on the question; they are often 
expressing their displeasure with government more generally. In 1992 
the Canadian people were meant to be voting on constitutional change. 
In fact they used the referendum to punish Mulroney for neglecting 
their economic problems.
Much the same happened in the EU referendum in the UK. Many 
Leave voters were genuinely hostile to the EU, especially because of 
immigration policy. But many others used the EU as a scapegoat for their 
other frustrations and discontents, for example over economic austerity or 
the dominance of London as compared with the rest of the country. The 
Leave campaign exploited these frustrations with their simple message of 
‘take back control’, though few of the outstanding problems would be solved 
by leaving the EU and many would be made worse. The Remain campaign 
did not wake up to the depth of these discontents until it was too late.
Lesson 2 Campaign positively and vigorously
In Canada, the No campaign in 1995 was low key and appealed to 
reason. It was negative, pointing out the dangers of separation, and 
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nearly led to disaster. In contrast the Yes campaign was positive; it 
appealed to the heart and stressed the benefits of Quebec sovereignty. 
Only the emotional impact of the late Montreal rally saved the No side 
and kept Quebec in Canada.
For the EU referendum there was a similar contrast between 
the two campaigns. The Remain side relied on gloomy forecasts from 
the Treasury or the International Monetary Fund to underline the 
economic dangers of leaving the EU. But this negative campaigning 
turned people off and was mocked by the Leave side as ‘Project Fear’. 
The Remainers failed to articulate the benefits of being part of the 
European Union and did nothing to appeal to wider aspirations. This 
gave the Leave campaign a free hand to promise extravagant and often 
imaginary benefits as the result of leaving the EU. People responded 
positively to this optimistic narrative, even if they did not necessarily 
believe all of it.
Lesson 3 Get your backers out on the day
In Quebec in 1995 the voter turnout was exceptional, at 93 per cent. 
Only one out of 15 electors failed to vote, so that both sides evidently 
made superhuman efforts to get their backers to the polls. Chrétien 
stressed the importance of this after the Montreal rally:
All weekend the No team, by now invigorated and united in a 
common cause … never let up in its efforts … to get out our 
voters. If we hadn’t done that, I’m certain we would have lost.47
The turnout for the 2016 EU referendum was 72 per cent. This was a high 
figure for a national vote in the UK. Yet even so, one out of four electors 
failed to get to the polls and this determined the result. Polls before 
the referendum showed clearly that older people favoured Leaving 
and were more likely to vote. Young people favoured Remaining, but 
their voting behaviour was less predictable. In the event, 64 per cent of 
electors under 25 voted, more than in early estimates, as against 90 per 
cent of those over 65.48 The Remain campaign would have known how 
important it was to get young people out to vote, but did not do enough 
to make this happen.
Finally, the result of the EU referendum has transformed the 
prospects for Scotland. Canada’s experience is again relevant, in two 
different ways.
After the Scottish referendum of 2014, Nicola Sturgeon, the 
leader of the Scottish Nationalists, seemed to be in the same position as 
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Lucien Bouchard when he took over from Parizeau as Quebec premier. 
Bouchard decided it was prudent to wait before holding another 
referendum. He wanted to ensure Quebec’s economy was strong enough 
to survive on its own, detached from Canada. Only then would he feel 
confident of winning. But his chance never came.
The position in Scotland appeared to be comparable. Sturgeon 
would not want to risk another referendum unless she was sure of 
winning it. Scotland’s economic prospects already looked doubtful 
when the 2014 referendum was held and have since worsened with 
the fall in the price of oil, Scotland’s major asset. The UK government 
undertook to pass more revenue-raising powers to Scotland, which, 
over time, would reveal the true economic outlook of an independent 
Scotland. As in Quebec after 1995, these factors argued against an early 
new referendum.
But the result of the EU referendum of 2016 has changed the 
position fundamentally and invites a different Canadian comparison. 
The events of 1995 in Quebec flowed directly from the defeat of the 
constitutional referendum of 1992. This had been intended to reconcile 
Quebec with the rest of Canada, but failed to do so. The separatist Parti 
Québécois regained power, called another referendum and very nearly 
won it.
Unlike England and Wales, Scotland voted to remain in the EU, 
by 62 per cent against 38 per cent. The Scots realized how much they 
had to lose by leaving the European Union. Sturgeon appealed to Prime 
Minister Theresa May for a separate deal that would enable Scotland to 
stay in the EU Single Market, but May declined it, insisting on a single 
negotiating position for the United Kingdom. The political impact of 
Brexit therefore encouraged Sturgeon to bring forward a new independ-
ence referendum. In March 2017 she abruptly called for one, creating 
an additional problem for May just as she prepared to invoke Article 50 
of the Lisbon Treaty.49 Whenever this referendum takes place, the three 
Canadian lessons will still apply.
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